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Abstract
A. Silverberg (IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 49, 2003) proposed a ques-
tion on the equivalence of identifiable parent property and traceability prop-
erty for Reed-Solomon code family. Earlier studies on Silverberg’s problem
motivate us to think of the stronger version of the question on equivalence
of separation and traceability properties. Both, however, still remain open.
In this article, we integrate all the previous works on this problem with an
algebraic way, and present some new results. It is notable that the concept
of subspace subcode of Reed-Solomon code, which was introduced in error-
correcting code theory, provides an interesting prospect for our topic.
Keywords : Separation, Traceability, Reed-Solomon Code, Silverberg’s Problem,
Subspace Subcode
1 Introduction
The growth of Internet raised the problem of illegal redistribution as a major con-
cern in digital content industry, because copying such material is easy and no
information is lost in the process. To protect digital copies, however, is a com-
plicated task. Methods like cryptography do not resolve this problem, since the
information must be decrypted at one point to be able to use it. The goal of digi-
tal fingerprinting is to discourage people from illegally redistributing their legally
purchased copy. In this scenario, the distributor embeds into the digital content,
using a watermark algorithm, a unique piece of information(fingerprint) for each
user. If an illegal copy is found, the distributor can extract the fingerprint from it to
identity the dishonest user(pirate). Because the pirate may try to damage the fin-
gerprint before redistribution, the watermarking algorithm must ensure robustness
to the distributor.
Nevertheless, the most dangerous attack against digital fingerprinting is the
collusion attack introduced in [1]. The contents delivered to different users are,
2since their fingerprints differ, essentially different. Two or more pirates may com-
pare their copies and reveal the locations of part of fingerprint. With deleting or
modifying those locations, pirates can generate a new copy of content in order
not to be traced. This collusion attack could not only violate pirate-identifying
but frame an innocent user in some cases. We are interested in designing a set of
fingerprints(fingerprinting code) with which the distributor can always identity at
least one colluder from a forged fingerprint with a small error probability. In par-
ticular separating code, IPP code and TA code are most important fingerprinting
codes with different collusion-secure properties for generic digital data.
We will denote the ith component of any tuple x by xi and the Hamming dis-
tance between two tuples x, y by d(x, y). Let n, w, w1 and w2 be positive integers
such that n, w, w1 ≥ 2 and w1 ≥ w2. Suppose C is a code of length n over Fq.
• We define descendant set of an arbitrary nonempty subset U of C by
descU := {x ∈ Fnq | ∀i, ∃y ∈ U : xi = yi}
• C is a (w1, w2)-separating code provided that, if U1, U2 are disjoint subsets
of C such that 1 ≤ |U1| ≤ w1 and 1 ≤ |U2| ≤ w2, then their descendant
sets are also disjoint.
• C is called a w-identifiable parent property code(IPP code) provided that
for all x ∈ Fnq , the set IPPw(x) := {U ⊂ C | x ∈ descU, 1 ≤ |U | ≤ w} is
empty or
⋂
U⊂IPPw(x)
U 6= φ.
• C is called a w-traceability code(TA code) provided that if U ⊂ C, 1 ≤
|U | ≤ w and x ∈ descU , there exist at least one codeword y ∈ U such that
d(x, y) < d(x, z) for all z ∈ C\U .
The code classes defined above are known to satisfy the following relationships.
Proposition 1.1 (see [9]) Let d be the minimum distance of a code C of length n.
Then for C,
d > n(1− 1/w2) ⇒ w-TA ⇒ w-IPP ⇒ (w,w)-separating
Proposition 1.2 (see [2]) Let d be the minimum distance of a code C of length n.
If d > n(1− 1/(w1w2)), then C is a (w1, w2)-separating code.
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ q − 1 be an integer. The Reed-Solomon code RSk(q) of dimension k
over Fq is defined by RSk(q) := {ev(f) | f ∈ Fq[x], degf < k}, where ev : f ∈
Fq[x] 7→ (f(α
0), f(α1), · · · , f(αq−2)) ∈ Fq−1q and α is a primitive element in Fq.
It is well known that RSk(q) is a [q − 1, k, q − k]-linear code.
3Reed-Solomon code is one of the most famous error-correcting codes and it
also has an application in digital fingerprinting. A. Silverberg, et al. [8] dealt
with applying list decoding method to tracing algorithms of fingerprinting codes.
In their work, the collusion-secure properties of Reed-Solomon codes and other
algebraic geometry codes were studied, and the following question was left as an
open problem.
Question 1 Is it the case that d > n− n/w2 for all w-IPP Reed-Solomon codes
of length n and minimum distance d?
Thus, Silverberg’s question is a problem of the equivalence of IPP and traceability
for Reed-Solomon code family.
The problem was studied in [4] and [7]. In [4], they restated the separation
property of Reed-Solomon codes algebraically, as a system of equations, to get
the following result.
Theorem 1.1 (see [4]) Suppose k − 1 divides q − 1. If RSk(q) is a (w1, w2)-
separating code, then d > n− n/(w1w2) where d is minimum distance.
In [7], they presented the similar result as follows by establishing an additive
homomorphism over finite field.
Theorem 1.2 (see [7]) Suppose w2 > q or w divides q. If RSk(q) is a (w,w)-
separating code, then d > n− n/w2 where d is minimum distance.
As you can see, the previous works claimed the stronger fact than Silverberg’s
original problem in certain cases. In this context, we naturally raise the following
question, which turns out to be the main topic of this article.
Question 2 Is it the case that d > n − n/(w1w2) for all (w1, w2)-separating
Reed-Solomon codes of length n and minimum distance d?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we will present a
sufficient condition for non-separation of linear codes, and prove that the previous
works can be derived from that condition. Some more parameter setups providing
positive answer about Question 2 will be obtained in Section 3. In Section 4, the
application of subspace subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes will be unveiled. We
conclude the paper in Section 5 after presenting experimental results to show the
extension of our work.
Throughout the remaining, Fq is Galois field with order q = pm and char-
acteristic p. Let ri = [logpwi], i = 1, 2. For any polynomial f over Fq, let
Imf = f(Fq). For an arbitrary word x ∈ Fnq , Imx is the set of all its compo-
nents, i.e. Imx = {xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. For given two sets E, F ⊂ Fq, we define
EF := {ab | a ∈ E, b ∈ F} and E + F := {a + b | a ∈ E, b ∈ F}. We will
denote the set of all polynomials over Fq of degree less than k by Pk. n, w, w1 and
w2 are positive integers satisfying n, w, w1 ≥ 2 and w1 ≥ w2.
42 Restatement of the Previous Works
In this section we propose a sufficient condition for non-separation of linear codes,
which will integrate the former results in [4] and [7]. The idea was motivated by
[7], where an additive homomorphism was established such that its image set has
a special property. Before presenting the major result, we will formally define
such ”special property” of a set.
Let U be a subset of Fq. U is called additively (multiplicatively) (w1, w2)-
separable and written by U = (E, F )w1,w2 provided that there exist two subsets
E, F ⊂ U with 1 ≤ |E| ≤ w1 and 1 ≤ |F | ≤ w2 such thatU ⊂ E+F (U ⊂ EF ).
The following theorem is the main result of this section. Note that it is not just
for Reed-Solomon codes, but for linear codes.
Theorem 2.1 Let C be [n, k]q-linear code containing 1= (1, 1, · · · , 1). Sup-
pose there exists a codeword c = (c1, c2, · · · , cn) ∈ C such that |Imc| ≥ 2 and
Imc is (w1, w2)-separable additively or multiplicatively. Then, C is not (w1, w2)-
separating.
Proof. We will only prove when Imc is additively (w1, w2)-separable, since the
other case can be proven in similar way. Let Imc = (E, F )w1,w2 . Define U :=
{β · 1 | β ∈ E} and V := {c − γ · 1 | γ ∈ F}. Then U, V ⊂ C since c, 1 ∈ C
and C is a linear code. Further, U and V are disjoint because |Imc| ≥ 2. For
all i ∈ 1, n, there exist βi ∈ E and γi ∈ F such that ci = βi + γi. If we set
x := (β1, β2, · · · , βn), it is clear that x ∈ descU ∩ descV which implies non-
separation. ⊡
The following corollary is the Reed-Solomon code version of Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.1 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ q−1 be an integer. If there exists a non-constant poly-
nomial f in Pk such that Imf is (w1, w2)-separable additively or multiplicatively,
then the code RSk(q) is not (w1, w2)-separating.
By definition, RSk(q) ⊂ RSk+1(q), therefore the code RSk+1(q) is not (w1, w2)-
separating if RSk(q) is not (w1, w2)-separating. Meanwhile, the inequality d >
n − n/(w1w2) is equivalent with k − 1 < (q − 1)/(w1w2) for Reed-Solomon
codes. Thus, it sufices to consider the case k = ⌈(q − 1)/(w1w2)⌉ + 1 when
we study Question 2. In other words, if RSk(q) is not (w1, w2)-separating where
k = ⌈(q−1)/(w1w2)⌉+1 for given q, w1, w2, Question 2 has the positive answer.
(see [7])
In this context, we will reprove the previous results done on Silverberg’s open
problem more simply using Corollary 2.1.
5Proof of Theorem 1.1 : Suppose d ≤ n(1 − 1/(w1w2)), i.e. k − 1 ≥ (q −
1)/(w1w2). Set f(x) := xk−1. Since k − 1 | q − 1, the polynomial f is a multi-
plicative homomorphism mapping F∗q to F∗q . So Imf is a multiplicative subgroup
of F∗q with order |Imf | = |F∗q|/|Kerf | = (q−1)/(k−1) ≤ w1w2. For F∗q is cyclic,
Imf is also cyclic, thus, it has a generator γ. Set E := {γiw2 | 0 ≤ i ≤ w1 − 1}
and F := {γj | 0 ≤ j ≤ w2−1}. Then it is easy to check that Imf = (E, F )w1,w2 ,
which implies non-separation by Corollary 2.1. Therefore, if RSk(q) is (w1, w2)-
separating, then k − 1 < (q − 1)/(w1w2). ⊡
Proof of Theorem 1.2 : As we mentioned above, it sufices to consider the case
k = ⌈(q−1)/w2⌉+1 only. Assume w2 > q. Then k = 2, thus k−1|q−1, which
makes the condition of Theorem 1.1. Now let’s assume that w|q. The polynomial
f(x) := xq/w
2
−x is an additive homomorphism overFq and |Imf | = w2. By finite
group theory, there exist subgroups E, F < Imf with w elements, respectively,
such that Imf = E + F . Further, f ∈ Pk. Thus, from Corollary 2.1 the code
RSk(q) is not (w1, w2)-separating. ⊡
From the preceding proofs, we claim that the results in [4] and [7] can be
integrated into a simpler scheme. We conclude this section with the following
proposition that resembles Theorem 1.2 without proof.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose w1w2 divides q. If RSk(q) is a (w1, w2)-separating
code, then d > n− n/(w1w2) where d is minimum distance.
3 New Parameter Setups
w1, w2 and q are the parameters specifying Reed-Solomon code and its separation
property. The aim of this section is to propose new configurations of them that
provide Question 2 with positive answer. The underlying principle is again Theo-
rem 2.1 or Corollary 2.1.
In this section, we suppose that k − 1 | q where k = ⌈(q − 1)/(w1w2)⌉ + 1.
Since q is a prime power, there exists an integer s such that q/(k − 1) = ps. One
can easily check that ps is the largest power of p which is equal or less than w1w2.
Therefore, s = r1 + r2 or s = r1 + r2 + 1.
The main idea is to set f(x) := xk−1 − x, prove that Imf is additively or
multiplicatively (w1, w2)-separable, and refer to Corollary 2.1. It is obvious that
f ∈ Pk is an additive homomorphism over Fq and therefore Imf is an additive
group with ps elements. Thus, the problem is to find the setups such that Imf is
(w1, w2)-separable. The first setup is s = r1 + r2.
Proposition 3.1 If s = r1 + r2, then Imf is additively (w1, w2)-separable.
6Proof. For |Imf | = pr1+r2 , there exist two additive subgroups E and F with
Imf = E + F such that |E| = pr1 and |F | = pr2 . Therefore, Imf = (E, F )w1,w2 .
⊡
The second setup is [w1/pr1] · [w2/pr2 ] ≥ p.
Proposition 3.2 If [w1/pr1 ] · [w2/pr2] ≥ p, Imf is additively (w1, w2)-separable.
Proof. If s = r1 + r2, Imf is additively (w1, w2)-separating by Proposition 3.1.
Assume s = r1 + r2 + 1. Then there exist three additive subgroups E, F and P
of Imf with Imf = E + F + P such that |E| = pr1, |F | = pr2 and |P | = p.
Moreover, P is cyclic since p is a prime number. Let α be its generator. If we set
P1 := {(i · [w2/p
r2])γ | 0 ≤ i ≤ [w1/p
r1 ]−1}, P2 := {jγ | 0 ≤ j ≤ [w2/p
r2]−1}
and E ′ = E + P1, F ′ = F + P2, then we get P = P1 + P2 and Imf = E ′ + F ′
since [w1/pr1 ] · [w2/pr2] ≥ p. Therefore, Imf is additively (w1, w2)-separable. ⊡
The results of this section can be integrated into the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose k − 1 divides q with q/(k − 1) = ps, and s ≤ r1 + r2
or [w1/p
r1] · [w2/p
r2] ≥ p. If RSk(q) is a (w1, w2)-separating code, then d >
n− n/(w1w2) where d is minimum distance.
Now we state the following lemma which will be useful for the next section.
Lemma 3.1 The finite field Fps is (w1, w2)-separable if at least one of the follow-
ings hold :
• s ≤ r1 + r2
• [w1/p
r1] · [w2/p
r2] ≥ p
• w1w2 − w2 ≥ p
s
Proof. We can prove in the first and second cases similarly with the propositions
above since Imf is additively isomorphism with Fps . So we will only consider
the third case. It is well known that F∗ps = Fps\{0} is a multiplicative cyclic
group. Denote by α its generator. Set E := {αi(w2−1) | 0 ≤ i ≤ w1 − 1} and
F := {αj | 0 ≤ j ≤ w2 − 2}. Then EF = {αi | 0 ≤ i ≤ w1w2 − w2} and
F
∗
ps = EF since w1w2−w2 ≥ ps. Thus, if we set F ′ = F ∪ {0}, then Fps = EF ′
which implies Fps = (E, F ′)w1,w2 . ⊡
74 Application of Subspace Subcodes
In a linear code, there are some codewords all of whose components belong to
a certain subset of Fq. Collecting such codewords is a method of constructing
a new code from an existing code, and it was studied in [3], [6] and [5]. Sub-
field subcode in [3] is a set of codewords whose components all lie in a subfield.
Subgroup subcodes, or subspace subcodes were introduced in [6] and [5], where
their dimensions were estimated. Let S be a v-dimensional subspace of Fq where
0 ≤ v ≤ m. Subspace subcode of Reed-Solomon code C = RSk(q) with S is
defined to be the set of codewords from C whose components all lie in S, and
is denoted by SSRSS(C). In this section, we will study application of subspace
subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes to Question 2 in case p = 2 and q = 2m. It is
related to the dimensions of SSRSS(C).
SSRSS(C) is an F2-linear space. In [5], the explicit formula to calculate the
binary dimension of SSRSS(C) denoted by K(C, S) was proposed as follows :
K(C, S) =
∑
j∈In
dj(aj − rj)
where In is the set consisting of the smallest integers in each modulo n = 2m − 1
cyclotomic coset, dj is the cardinality of the coset containing j denoted by Ωj , ej is
the number of elements from Ωj lying in the set J = {1, 2, · · · , k}, aj = mej/dj
and rj’s are the ranks of certain (m−v)×aj matrices called cyclotomic matrices.
As well as the explicit formula, they presented the following lower bound for
the binary dimension :
K(C, S) ≥ L(k, v) =
∑
j∈In
max{dj(aj − (m− v)), 0}
We will call subspace subcode SSRSS(C) trivial, provided that K(C, S) ≤ v.
Then the following lemma is immediately obtained.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that there exists a v-dimensional subspace of Fq denoted by
S such that the subspace subcode of C = RSk(q) with S is non-trivial. Then, C
is not (w1, w2)-separating, provided that S is (w1, w2)-separable.
Proof. There exists a codword c ∈ SSRSS(C) with |Imc| ≥ 2 because of non-
triviality. Therefore, by Theorem 2.1, C is not (w1, w2)-separating. ⊡
By using the lower bound L(k, v), we can get the more practical result about
Question 2. L(k, v) depends on the dimension of the parent code k and the dimen-
sion of the subspace s, not the subspace S itself. So we can restrict to S = F2v .
Suppose SSRSS(C) is trivial, then SSRST (C) is also trivial where T is a subspace
of S. Therefore it sufices to consider the largest power 2v equal or less than w1w2.
8Theorem 4.1 Let 2v be the largest power equal or less than w1w2, which satisfies
at least one of the following conditions hold, and suppose L(k, v) > v.
• v ≤ r1 + r2
• [w1/2
r1] · [w2/2
r2] ≥ 2
• w1w2 − w2 ≥ 2
v
If RSk(q) is a (w1, w2)-separating code, then d > n − n/(w1w2) where d is
minimum distance.
Proof. SSRSS(C) is non-trivial since K(C, S) ≥ L(k, v) > v where S = F2v .
Plus, F2v is (w1, w2)-separable by Lemma 3.1. Therefore, applying Lemma 4.1
implies the conclusion. ⊡
5 Examples and Conclusions
In this article, we presented an algebraic statement for the generalized version of
Silverberg’s open problem, and exploited it to integrate the former results. Besides
the previous results, we could procure some new parameter setups ensuring the
equivalence of separation and traceability properties for Reed-Solomon codes.
Finally using the concept of subspace subcode introduced in error-correcting code
theory, we proposed a new result when the characteristic of finite field is 2.
Table-1 illustrates the contributions of our work to Silverberg’s open problem
for some parameters. For each w and q, we set k = ⌈(q − 1)/w2⌉ + 1 and check
(w,w)-separation property of RSk(q) by the existing results. In each cell, the
source of the work is written if RSk(q) is not (w,w)-separating. For example,
”[4]” means that non-separation is proven by Theorem 1.1, and ”3.1” represents
that it is followed by Theorem 3.1 of our paper. The symbol ”*” denotes the trivial
cases w2 ≥ q, and ”-” stands for pending cases.
Example 1 : Let w = 15 and q = 256. Then k = ⌈(q − 1)/w2⌉ + 1 = 3.
So k − 1 | q. Moreover, since (15/23)2 > 2, the condition of Theorem 3.1 holds.
Therefore RSk(q) is not (w,w)-separating. Now let w = 10 and q = 128. Then
(10/23)2 < 2. However, q/(k − 1) = 64 = 26, so the condition of Theorem 3.1
holds and RSk(q) is not (w,w)-separating.
Example 2 : Let w = 12 and q = 2048. Then k = 16. Theorem 3.1 cannot
be applied in this case, since k − 1 = 15 divides neither q nor q − 1. The largest
power of 2 equal or less than w2 = 144 satisfying at least one of the conditions
in Lemma 4.1 is 27 = 128, for w2 − w = 132 > 128. The modulo n = 2047
9cyclotomic coset containing 1 is Ω1 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024},
therefore dj = |Ω1| = 11 and aj = ej = |Ω1 ∩ J | = 5 where J = {1, 2, · · · , 16}.
So K(C, S) ≥ L(k, v) ≥ max{d1(a1 − (m − v)), 0} = 11 > 7, which implies
RSk(q) is not (w1, w2)-separating by Theorem 4.1.
q 16 32 64 81 125 128 243 256 512 1024 2048 2187
w = 2 [7] [7] [7] [4] [4] [7] - [7] [7] [7] - [7]
w = 3 - - [4] [7] - - [7] - - - - [7]
w = 4 [4] [7] [7] [4] - [7] - [7] [7] [7] [7] -
w = 5 * 3.1 [4] [4] [7] - - - - - - -
w = 7 * * 3.1 3.1 - 4.1 - - - - - -
w = 9 * * * [4] [4] 3.1 [7] 3.1 [4] - - [7]
w = 10 * * * [4] [4] 3.1 3.1 [4] - [4] - -
w = 12 * * * * * * [4] 3.1 3.1 3.1 4.1 -
w = 13 * * * * * * [4] 3.1 3.1 4.1 - -
w = 14− 15 * * * * * * [4] 3.1 4.1 - - -
w = 17 * * * * * * * * 3.1 3.1 3.1 -
w = 18 * * * * * * * * 3.1 3.1 4.1 -
w = 19− 22 * * * * * * * * 3.1 [4] - -
w = 24 * * * * * * * * * 3.1 3.1 -
w = 28− 31 * * * * * * * * * 3.1 4.1 3.1
w = 34− 40 * * * * * * * * * * 3.1 [4]
Table-1. Contributions to Silverberg’s Problem for Some Parameters
Thus, for a large family of Reed-Solomon codes with 2 ≤ w ≤ 40 and 16 ≤ q ≤
2187, the separation and traceability properties are equivalent.
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